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INTRODUCTION
Ross Perot is strongly opposed to lobbyists, domestic
and particularly foreign. On several occasions, he has
denounced their activities as harmful to the American peo-
ple. In his latest book, Not For Sale At Anv Price; How
We Can Save America For Our Children , the Texas billion-
aire and candidate for the presidency in 1992 proposes to
" [e] liminate foreign lobbyists." 1 Perot thinks that the
Americans would approve such a measure because "75% be-
lieve that foreign lobbyists have too much influence over
public policy". 2 Congress should take action and "'[m]ake
it a criminal act for anyone involved.'" 3
Perhaps unknowingly, Perot touches on an issue that
lies at the core of the American political system. Before
concentrating on the particular role of foreign lobbying,
it will therefore be helpful to trace the theories of
American political science regarding special interest
groups
.
Interest groups in the United States are older than
the Union itself, and so are the worries that they exert
1. H. Ross Perot, Not For Sale At Anv Price: How We
Can Save America For Our Children , (New York, NY: Hyper-
ion, 1993), p. 149.
2. Perot, Nor For Sale at Anv Price , p. 149.
3. B. Drummond Ayres Jr., "Perot Calls For Politics
Of Renewal", The New York Times . March 22, 1993, p. A10.
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too much influence. In essay no. 10 of The Federalist .
James Madison states that "[a]mong the numerous advantages
promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction." 4 By faction, or, as we
would say today, interest group, he understands "a number
of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in-
terests of the community." 5
Factions are no temporary problem. Man, Madison ad-
monishes, has always had the propensity to pursue his
self-interest at the expense of others and the common
good, and the "latent causes of faction are thus sown in
the nature of man". 6
There are two methods to cure the "mischiefs of fac-
tion". 7 First, to abolish liberty, which is a prerequi-
site for the existence of faction; and second, to control
the effects of faction. The first remedy is, according to
4.
The Federalist, or. The New Constitution , ed. by
Max Beloff, 2d ed. , (New York, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987)
,
p. 41.
5. The Federalist , p. 42.
6. The Federalist , p. 42.
7. The Federalist , p. 42.
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Madison, "worse than the disease". 8 Instead, he says, re-
lief from the pressures of interest groups is supplied by
a republic.
A republican form of government features the princi-
ple of representation, i.e. the delegation of decision
making authority to a small number of citizens elected by
the rest. This chosen legislative body "may best discern
the true interest of their country" 9 and is least likely
to succumb to group interests.
Moreover, unlike a democracy, which Madison considers
to be designed for a small number of citizens, a republic
is able to encompass a larger number of people. The big-
ger the electorate and the more numerous the variety of
parties and groups, the less likely one faction is to dom-
inate the others, argues Madison.
This Madisonian ideal was adopted with some modifica-
tions by the advocates of pluralist theory in the 1950s
and 1960s. David Truman wrote in The Governmental Pro-
cess
.
published in 1951, that "the process of government
cannot be adequately understood apart from the groups, es-
pecially the organized and potential interest groups". 10
He pointed to the multiplicity of points of access to gov-
8. The Federalist , p. 42.
9. The Federalist , p. 45.
10. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process:.
Political Interests and Public Opinion , (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1963), p. 502.
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ernmental decisions and emphasized that " [t]his diversity
assures a variety of modes for the participation of inter-
est groups in the formation of policy, a variety that is a
flexible, stabilizing element." 11
The pluralist theory was further developed by Robert
Dahl in 1961. In Who Governs? . 12 Dahl studied local poli-
tics in New Haven, Connecticut, and found that in the
three important local issue areas (political nominations,
urban development, and public education) different groups
of people were influential. He rejected the idea that
there was only one clique of politically powerful people
ruling society, as asserted by C. Wright Mills and oth-
13ers . LJ
The importance of the pluralist theory soon began to
decline, however. There were two major kinds of criti-
cisms, one methodological and the other normative.
From the methodological perspective, it was noted
that the pluralists asked "too narrow a set of ques-
tions." 14 Who Governs? showed how local issues were de-
bated and resolved by interested groups and government
11. Truman, The Governmental Process , p. 519.
12. See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and
Power in an American City . (New Haven, London: Yale
University Press, 1961)
.
13. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite , (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1956)
.
14. Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society, 2d
ed., (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989), p. 11.
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agencies. But the basic structure of the community and
matters of higher political significance, such as the
distribution of wealth, were never touched by the partici-
pating bodies. Thus, it was maintained that the plural-
ists asked "biased questions [about the policy making pro-
cess] and therefore received misleading answers." 15
The other line of criticism focused on the conserva-
tive element in pluralism. Theodore Lowi attacked "the
maintenance of old and the creation of new structures of
privilege". 16 The pluralists, he asserted, had propagated
the faith that "a system built primarily upon groups and
bargaining is self-corrective. 1,17 It was a myth "that
when competition between or among groups takes place the
results yield a public interest or some other ideal re-
sult." 18
Political reality in the 1960s and 1970s also re-
vealed the inadequacy of the pluralist theory. The civil
rights movement showed that Afro-Americans as a political
group were excluded from policy making. Doubts in the
government were further nourished by the Vietnam War.
15. Berry, The Interest Group Society , p. 11.
16. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Sec-
ond Republic of the United States , 2d ed., (New York, Lon-
don: W. W. Norton, 1979), pp. 58-59.
17 . Lowi
,
The End of T.iberalism. p. 57.
18. Lowi The End of Liberalism, p. 57
.
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In political science circles, however, no fully
articulated alternative to the pluralist theory was of-
fered due to the difficulties in designing a new, all-en-
compassing and integrated model for American government.
Despite the criticism of interest group politics as en-
dorsed by the supporters of the pluralist theory, societal
pluralism was still seen as desirable. Deficiencies in
the policy process resulted in calls for more rather than
less participation by the citizens. With its reforms in
the 1970s, Congress responded to the demand to increase
the openness of the policy process. The number of special
interest groups grew dramatically (the so-called "advocacy
explosion" 19 ) . The ways of policy making in Washington,
D.C., were fundamentally affected.
By the 1970s, literature on Congress stressed the im-
portance of 'subgovernments', which was basically a con-
tinuation of the pluralist theory. 20 Subgovernments usu-
ally included three actors: members of Congress and their
staff, key agency administrators, and a limited number of
representatives of the pressure groups affected by the
respective legislation. Said Richard Rose, "The fundamen-
19. Berry, The Interest Group Society , p. 16.
20. See Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin,
Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy , rev. ed. ,
(Homewood, II: Dorsey Press, 1980); and Richard Rose,
"Government against Sub-governments: A European Perspec-
tive on Washington", Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman,
Presidents and Prime Ministers . (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 284-347.
6
tal fact of American government is that political power is
divided among many dozens of sub-governments in Washing-
ton, whose tentacles extend throughout the federal sys-
tern." Since they dominated policy making in special ar-
eas and because they were very stable, these subgovern-
ments were called 'cozy little triangles', 'triple al-
liances', or 'iron triangles'. 22
More recently, Hugh Heclo and others have elaborated
on the subgovernment model. 'Issue networks' have been
suggested as a more accurate concept of current policy
making. 23 Heclo explains an issue network as a "shared-
knowledge group" 24 dealing with a particular aspect of
politics. The growing number of groups that have a polit-
ical interest in an issue discussed by the government has
weakened the hegemony of the old group representatives.
Unlike subgovernments, it is "almost impossible to say
21. Richard Rose, "Government against Sub-govern-
ments", p. 294.
22. See Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek,
Congress and Its Members . 3d ed. , (Washington, DC: Con-
gressional Quarterly, 1990), p. 292.
23. Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Es-
tablishment", Anthony King (ed.) The New American Politi-
cal System
.
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1978), pp. 87-124. See also Jeffrey M. Berry, "Sub-
governments, Issue Networks, and Political Conflict",
Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis (eds.) Remaking
American Politics . (Boulder, San Francisco, London: West-
view Press, 1989), pp. 239-260.
24. Heclo, "Issue Networks", p. 103.
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where a network leaves off and its environment begins" 26
since participants "move in and out of the networks con-
stantly." 26 Consequently, the policy making process has
become more diverse and congressional bargaining more com-
plex.
This is true not only for domestic policy but also
for foreign and international economic policy. As Andreas
Falke puts it, "[D]omestic pluralism has created the pre-
conditions for international pluralism." 27 A number of
factors such as growing global economic interdependence,
large foreign investments in the U.S., and a high trade
deficit have contributed to increased lobbying efforts by
foreign governments and corporations to exert influence on
the U.S. policy making process. Today, issue networks of-
ten include representatives of foreign interests.
For decades, Congress has been aware and suspicious
of foreign groups trying to mold its decisions. Already
in 1938, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) re-
quired foreign nationals and Americans lobbying on behalf
of foreign interests to register with the Department of
25. Heclo, "Issue Networks", p. 102
.
26. Heclo, "Issue Networks", p. 102.
27. Andreas Falke, "International Pluralism in Wash-
ington? Foreign Lobbying and American Foreign Economic
Policy", Lothar Hoennighausen and Andreas Falke (eds.),
Washington. D.C.: Interdisciplinary Approaches , (Tuebin-
gen, Basel: Franke, 1993), pp. 61-78; here: p. 64.
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State and publicly disclose their activities.^® FARA has
been amended several times since, but critics have always
pointed out the various loopholes of the act. The purpose
thesis is to describe the changes that have oc-
curred in foreign lobbying and explain why present lobby-
ing disclosure requirements are considered to be in-
adequate.
The framework of the study will be FARA. After an
introduction to the history and the current structure of
the act (Chapter I)
,
the data published by the Registra-
tion Unit of the Department of Justice will be analyzed to
determine who the foreign lobbyists are, by whom they are
hired, and the amounts of money they spend for their ac-
tivities (Chapter II)
.
Chapter III will deal with those issues that have
raised the eyebrows of both Congress and the public.
These are: one, contributions to political action commit-
tees; two, the revolving door, i.e. the practice of nu-
merous former high government officials to work on behalf
of foreign interests after leaving office? and three, the
political activities of the Japanese.
Government investigations of FARA and the response of
Congress to criticisms of the statute will be the focus of
28. See FARA at Title 22 United States Code, Sections
611 et seq. Public disclosure was also the aim of the
1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which covered do-
mestic lobbyists. See Title 2 United States Code, Sec-
tions 261 et seq.
9
Chapter IV. in the 102d Congress, several bills were
introduced to amend FARA but none was enacted. Action in
the 103d Congress has brought about the Senate's passage
of S. 349, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993, which
would radically change both domestic and foreign lobbying
disclosure regulations and thereby respond to the flaws
and loopholes of previous legislation as depicted in the
thesis
.
Finally, two notes have to be made as to the scope of
this study. One, it will only deal with foreign lobbying
efforts on the federal level or, to be more exact, in
Washington, D.C.
Two, the role of ethnic lobbying will not be exam-
ined. Several ethnic groups within the United States —
Hispanics, Eastern Europeans, Jews, Arabs, to mention but
some — try to participate in shaping government policy.
The influence of these ethnic groups varies greatly.
While the Israeli lobby, represented by the American Is-
rael Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
,
is considered
highly successful in pressing its concerns on Capitol
Hill, the Arab-American lobby has been rather ineffective.
This work, however, concentrates on the lobbying efforts
that are steered from abroad by foreign business and cor-
porate interests. Hence, American ethnic-based lobbying
10
activities though an interesting issue area — will not
be covered.
^
9
29. For further information on ethnic lobbying, see
Eric M. Uslaner, "A Tower of Babel on Foreign Policy?",
Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (eds.), Interest
Group Politics . 3d ed.
,
(Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly, 1991), pp. 299-318. The activities of AIPAC
and the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC) are analyzed in
David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest
Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel , (New
York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1990)
.
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CHAPTER I
THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938
A. History
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 was a re-
sult of congressional investigation in the field of for-
eign propaganda and lobbying. In the 1930s, members of
Congress became increasingly aware of foreign influence on
public opinion in the United States. Fascism spread over
Europe, and fascist groups strove to gain importance in
the U.S., too. In 1934, one year after Hitler came into
power in Germany, a congressional committee was estab-
lished to examine un-American and especially Nazi activi-
ties. The request for the creation of the committee was
submitted by Congressman Samuel Dickstein of New York.
Dickstein, being of Jewish faith himself, was particularly
concerned about the dangers posed by the Nazis, and he was
known for outspoken speeches. Representative John McCor-
mack of Massachusetts, "a man noted for calm and judicial
temperament", 30 was appointed chairman of the committee.
The first hearings were held in March 1934.
30. Morris Schonbach, Native American Fascism during
the 1930s and 1940s: A Study of Its Roots. Its Growth and
Its Decline
.
[Thesis Ph.D., University of California at
Los Angeles, 1958], (New York, London: Garland, 1985), p.
87.
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concluded its work
In January 1935, the committee
with a written record of some 4300 pages. it was pre-
sented
[ i ] ncontravertible evidence
... that there are
many persons in the United States representingforeign governments or foreign political groups
who are supplied by such foreign agencies withfunds and other materials to foster un-American
activities, and to influence the external andinternal policies of this country
. .
.
(31)
However, and maybe surprisingly, the Dickstein-McCor-
mack Committee did not support the prohibition of such
"pernicious propaganda". 32 On the contrary, mere exposure
was recommended. Foreign propagandists were to register
with the State Department and to submit accounts of their
activities. "This required registration," a House report
accompanying H.R. 1591 in the 75th Congress states, "will
publicize the nature of subversive or other similar
activities of such foreign propagandists, so that the
American people may know those who are engaged in this
country by foreign agencies to spread doctrines alien to
our democratic form of government". 33
On June 8, 1938, H.R. 1591 was passed by Congress and
became the Foreign Agents Registration Act, entitled "[a]n
Act [t]o require the registration of certain persons em-
31. U.S. Congress, House, 75th Congress, 1st Session,
Report No. 1381 . July 28, 1937, p. If.
32. Report No. 1381
.
p. 2.
33. Report No. 1381
.
p. 2.
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ployed by agencies to disseminate propaganda in the United
States and for other purposes." 34 Amendments, most of
which were of only marginal importance, were enacted in
1939, 1942, 1966, and 1970.
In its 1938-1942 versions, FARA focused on political
propagandists and their subversive activities. However,
after World War II, foreign propaganda in the U.S. became
less and less important as an issue. With growing global
trade, business interests came to play an ever larger
role. In the 1960s, unusually aggressive lobbying by for-
eign sugar companies in connection with the Sugar Act of
1962 caused an extensive investigation by the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. As a result, FARA was amended
in 1966. 35 Its main objective shifted from the control of
political propaganda to the disclosure of foreign economic
interests. There have been no major amendments to the act
since 1966.
B. Current Structure
Unless he is exempt from registration under the pro-
visions provided in FARA, every person who acts as an
agent of a foreign principal has to file a "Registration
34. Public Law No. 583, 75th Congress, 3d Session.
35. See U.S. Congress, House, 89th Congress, 2d Ses-
sion, House Report No. 1470 .
14
Statement" with the Attorney General. 36 Section 611 de-
fines the key terms of the act: person, 37 foreign princi-
3 8pal, agent of a foreign principal, 39 political propa-
ganda,^ 9 and political consultant .
^
36.
On May 29, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
transferred the registration functions from the Secretary
of State to the Attorney General with Executive Order No.
9176.
37. "The term 'person' includes an individual,
partnership, association, corporation, organization, or
any other combination of individuals." 22 U.S.C. 611(a).
38. "The term 'foreign principal' includes-
(1) a government of a foreign country and a for-
eign political party;
(2) a person outside of the United States, un-
less it is established that such person is an individual
and a citizen of and domiciled within the United States,
or that such person is not an individual and is organized
under or created by the laws of the United States or of
any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States and has its principal place of business
within the United States; and
(3) a partnership, association, corporation,
organization, or other combination of persons organized
under the laws of or having its principal place of busi-
ness in a foreign country." 22 U.S.C. 611(b).
39. With news or press associations of at least 80%
U.S. ownership being the exception, "the term 'agent of a
foreign principal' means-
(1) any person who acts as an agent, representa-
tive, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any
other capacity at the order, request, or under the direc-
tion or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any
of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised,
directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or
in major part by a foreign principal, and who directly or
through any other person-
(i) engages within the United States in po-
litical activities for or in the interest of such foreign
principal
;
(ii) acts within the United States as a
public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-
service employee or political consultant for or in the in-
terest of such foreign principal;
15
following in-
The registration statement includes the
formation: 42
1) the registrant's name and his business address;
(iii) within the United States solicitscollects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans'
money or other things of value for or in the interest ofsuch foreign principal; or
.
(iv ) within the United States representsthe interest of such foreign principal before any agency
or official of the Government of the United States; and
(2) any person who agrees, consents, assumes orpurports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be
whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an
agent of a foreign principal". 22 U.S.C. 611(c).
40.
The term 'political propaganda' includes any
orai, visuai, graphic, written, pictorial, or other commu-
nication or expression by any person
(1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the
person disseminating the same believes will, or which he
intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce,
or in any other way influence a recipient or any section
of the public within the United States with reference to
the political or public interests, policies, or relations
of a government of a foreign country or a foreign politi-
cal party or with reference to the foreign policies of the
United States or promote in the United States racial, re-
ligious, or social dissensions, or
(2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or
promotes any racial, social, political, or religious dis-
order, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of
force or violence (...)" 22 U.S.C. 611(j).
41.
"The term 'political consultant' means any person
who engages in informing or advising any other person with
reference to the domestic or foreign policies of the
United States or the political or public interest, poli-
cies, or relations of a foreign country or of a foreign
political party". 22 U.S.C. 611(p).
42.
See 22 U.S.C. 612(a) and the U.S. Department of
Justice Registration Statement, printed in U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Over-
sight of Government Management, The Federal Lobbying Dis-
closure Laws . Hearings, 102d Congress, 1st Session. June
20, July 16, September 25, 1991, (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 519f. (Hereafter
The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws )
.
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2) the registrant's status, i.e. whether the foreign
agent is a partnership, association, corporation, or
organization;
3) a description of the nature of the registrant's
regular business, a complete list of his employees, 43 the
name and address of every foreign principal for whom the
agent is acting;
4) copies of all written agreements and the terms and
conditions of each oral agreement;
5) the nature and the amount of all kinds of
contributions the registrant has received;
6) a full description of every activity which the
agent is performing on behalf of the foreign principal;
7) a detailed list of all expenditures made by the
registrant in connection with his being a foreign agent;
and
8) a statement on whether, and if yes, how and where
political propaganda will be disseminated.
After the initial registration, a foreign lobbyist
has to file a "Supplemental Statement" every six months. 44
He is required to give notice of any changes in his
43. Employees of the registrant have to file a
"Short-Form Registration Statement" unless their services
are only secretarial . See The Federal Lobbying Disclosure
Laws
.
p. 530f.
44. See 22 U.S.C. 612(b). The supplemental statement
forms are shown in The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws,
p. 534 f
.
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organization or in his relation to the foreign principals.
Furthermore, information on activities as well as on re-
ceipts and disbursements has to be updated. 45
C. Exemptions
Certain types of foreign agents are exempt from
registration. These are officials of foreign governments,
diplomatic and consular officers and their staff members,
and individuals who are engaged in "bona fide religious,
scholastic, academic, or scientific pursuits". 4 ^
Two other groups do not have to register, either.
The first are persons undertaking "private and nonpoliti-
cal activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or
commerce of [a] foreign principal". 47 This provision has
been called the "domestic subsidiary exemption" since it
covers efforts of lobbyists employed by U.S. subsidiaries
of foreign-owned companies.
Attorneys, the second body, are not required to give
accounts of their lobbying actions because FARA exempts
" [a]ny person qualified to practice law, insofar as he en-
45.
If the lobbyist disseminates political propa-
ganda, he has to file with the Registration Unit two
copies of each item within 48 hours after the initial dis-
semination. See "Notice to All Registrants", The Federal
Lobbying Disclosure Laws
, p. 578.
46. 22 U.S.C. 613 (e)
.
47. 22 U.S.C. 613 (d)
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gages or agrees to engage in the legal representation of a
disclosed foreign principal before any court of law or any
agency of the Government of the United States". 48 Though
it is added that "legal representation does not include
attempts to influence or persuade agency personnel or
officials other than in the course of established agency
proceedings", 49 lawyers have interpreted this subsection
very broadly. The result of both the commercial and the
attorney's exemption has been widespread unwillingness to
register.
48. 22 U.S.C. 613 (g)
.
49. 22 U.S.C. 613 (g)
19
CHAPTER II
FOREIGN LOBBYING IN THE 19808 AND 19908
A. Economic and Political Changes
Various factors in the economic and political devel-
opment of the United States have brought about an increase
in foreign lobbying activities. Trade between the U.S.
and the world has grown dramatically since the end of
World War II. Many corporations have become international
through the establishment of subsidiaries abroad. The
U.S. trade balance shifted from a considerable surplus in
the 1960s to an immense deficit. The current American
trend to import more goods than it exports has made count-
less businessmen and congressmen call for tariffs and
other protectionist measures. 50 These efforts, of course,
provoke counter-action by foreign corporations and, very
often, by American companies as well.
Unlike 20 or 30 years ago, it is not easy to draw a
line between domestic and foreign business. Foreign di-
rect investment in the U.S. soared from $83 billion in
1980 to $400.8 billion in 1989 — a leap of nearly 500% in
less than one decade. 51 Monies invested in American com-
50. At the end of June 1986, 248 out of a total of
782 international trade bills pending in Congress con-
tained explicit protectionist provisions. See Deborah L.
Levy, "Advice For Sale", Foreign Policy, no. 67, Summer
1987, pp. 64-86; here; p. 71.
20
panies to acquire 10 or more per cent of the stock climbed
from $21 billion in 1973 to nearly $160 billion in 1984. 52
Like the economy, the policy process has become more
complex. This is most obviously indicated by the sheer
size of the government. In 1963, there were 10 federal
departments and 70 federal agencies. These figures com-
pare to 14 federal departments and 140 federal agencies in
1991. The federal civilian workforce soared by 500,000
from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 during the same period. 53 The
number of staffs of members of the House and the Senate
rose to 11,659 in 1987, up from 3,556 in 1957. 54
The policy process has also become more diverse. Af-
ter the Vietnam War, Congress adopted a much more active
role in foreign policy making. Since Congress is the
"open flank" 55 of the U.S. political system, the openness
51. See Carol Matlack, "Sizing the Shackles", Na-
tional Journal , no. 32, August 11, 1990, pp. 1934-1939;
here: p. 1936. According to Levy, foreign investment to-
taled even at about $1 trillion in 1985. See Levy,
"Advice For Sale", p. 72.
52. See Maxwell Glen, "The Foreign Connection", Na-
tional Journal , no. 30, July 26, 1986, pp. 1832-1838;
here: p. 1833.
53. See the testimony of Dona O'Bannon before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, The
Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws , pp. 86-97; here: p. 87.
54. See Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann and
Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, 1989-
1990, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), p.
132.
55. Falke, "International Pluralism in Washington?",
p. 64
.
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of the foreign policy making process increased, thereby
allowing special interests such as ethnic or business
groups to become a part of the system.
The 1970s also brought reforms in Congress. The huge
power of the committee chairmen was diminished and many
new subcommittees were established. 56 Consequently, in-
stead of concentrating on just a few very powerful commit-
tee chairmen, interest groups had to lobby a larger number
of Congressmen.
Moreover, grass-roots lobbying has become an essen-
tial tool for political pressure. Special interest advo-
cates do not only try to contact members of Congress di-
rectly. The civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements
have proved that public policy can also be directed by
generating steam in the constituency. Most trade associa-
tions or public interest groups have developed their own
grass-roots network. Congressional aides confirm that
constituent letters, telegrams, and telephone calls count
more than anything else in influencing their bosses.
56. See, for example, "Part I: Patterns of Congres-
sional Change", Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer
(eds.)r Congress Reconsidered , 1st ed., (New York:
Praeger, 1977)
.
57. For those interest groups that do not have grass
roots networks, there is a particular branch of industry
that promises to take a "whisper of public interest" and
amplify it into a "roar of public pressure". See Congres-
sional Quarterly, The Washington Lobby , 5th ed., (Wash-
ington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), p. 7.
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decline adds to the diffusion of congressional
power. The president is forced to build consensus for
each law he wants passed — a difficult task especially,
but not only, during the times of divided government
(Republican president in the White House, Democratic ma-
jority on Capitol Hill). To get congressional approval,
the president cannot rely on partisanship as a strong in-
strument. Unlike their European counterparts, members of
Congress are dependent on the financial support of their
constituents, and not on the national parties. Senators
and representatives usually regard themselves as ambas-
sadors to Washington, sent to achieve as many federal
grants and projects for their constituencies as possible.
Thus, Congressmen are a potential target for every lobby-
ist.
In addition to the legislature, special interest ad-
vocates have to focus on the executive branch of govern-
ment. Due to the non-hierarchical structure of the U.S.
bureaucracy, many agencies can act rather independently.
Further, on issues concerning foreign trade partners,
there is often more than one agency dealing with the sub-
ject. Control over the export of high-technology, for ex-
ample, is shared by the State Department, the Commerce De-
partment, the Energy Department and the Department of De-
fense .
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Finally, when evaluating foreign lobbying efforts,
one has to keep in mind the general expansion in interest
group activities. According to several editions of Wash-
ington Representatives
. which lists names of people work-
ing in the capital to influence the government, the number
of lobbyists grew from some 8,000 in 1981 to more than
14,000 in 1993. 58 The total number of foreign and domes-
tic lobbyists registered with Congress rose from 2,000 in
1976 to 9,122 in 1986. 59 Analysts know, however, that
these figures are not the whole truth — the actual number
of lobbyists operating in Washington, D.C. is estimated to
be up to 80, 000. 60
B. Who Lobbies?
Parallel to the overall growth of interest group ac-
tivity, the number of foreign lobbyists has risen in re-
cent years. In 1977, the estimated number of such lobby-
ists was at 15,000 — 30 for each member of Congress. 61
58. See Washington Representatives , various editions,
(Washington, DC: Columbia Books)
.
59. See Levy, "Advice", p. 67.
60. See, for example, Michael Wines, "Senate Passes
Stringent New Rules for Lobbyists", The New York Times,
May 7, 1993, p. A18
.
61. See Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, The
Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold America's Foreign Po.Lz
icv
.
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), p. 6.
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However, the figures published by the Department of
Justice show a completely different picture. Most critics
of FARA consider the data of the Department of Justice to
be incorrect and incomplete. Any conclusions from these
figures have therefore to be drawn with care.
In 1991, 825 foreign agents were registered with the
Department of Justice, plus some 4,170 partners or employ-
ees affiliated with these agents. 62 Registrations in-
creased from 1981 to 1990 for most major trading partners
of the U.S., but only modestly. Japan had 86 registered
agents in 1981 and 114 in 1990. 63 Canada had hired 46
persons in 1981; nine years later, it had 81 at its dis-
posal. The third largest lobbyist, the United Kingdom,
employed 68 agents, up from 36.
There is no country with continuous growth over the
whole period projected. Registrations for the former
U.S.S.R., Mexico, and the Netherlands even diminished be-
tween 1981 and 1990.
Interestingly, most nations, including Japan, Great
Britain and Canada, reached a peak in 1987 and 1988,
respectively, and dropped afterwards. This shows that if
only the Justice Department's figures were taken into con-
62. See the prepared statement of Mark M. Richard
testifying before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Govern-
ment Management, The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws , pp.
194-261; here: p. 209f.
63. See Appendix, p. 65.
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sideration, foreign lobbying activities by the major trad-
ing partners of the U.S. must have decreased in recent
years. Since students of special interest representation
believe the opposite to be true, these official disclo-
sures are highly likely to be flawed.
C . Money
In 1985, those 850 or so foreign agents who had dis-
closed their activities spent approximately $150 mil-
lion. 64 Japan's budget was highest with $14,294,000, fol-
lowed by Canada ($7,531,000), West Germany ($6,362,000),
the U.S.S.R., Ireland, Indonesia, Scotland, Korea, Saudi
Arabia and France. 65 As with all figures published by the
Registration Unit of the Department of Justice, these
amounts are said to be only the tip of the iceberg. Ac-
cording to estimates, Japan spent $60 million in 1984, up
from $17 million in 1982. 66 Other sources even put annual
expenses by domestic and foreign special interest advo-
64. See Kathryn Johnson, "How Foreign Powers Play For
Status in Washington", U.S. News and World Report , June
17, 1985, pp. 35-40; here: p. 35.
65. See U.S. News and World Report , "How Foreign Pow-
ers Play For Status in Washington", p. 39. The expenses
of the respective countries are 1984 figures.
66. See U.S. News and World Report, "How Foreign Pow-
ers Play", p. 38.
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cates for lobbying Congress and the executive at more than
$1 billion. 67
Foreign agents can earn a lot of money. Top lobby-
ists get up to $400 an hour and retainers of $250,000 per
year. Some contracts also include "'success bonuses'" 68 -
- $7,000 for getting a bill introduced, $10,000 for pas-
sage in the committee, and $25,000 for approval in the
House or in the Senate.
Clients are governments as well as corporations.
Turkey paid $300,000 annually to have its interests pro-
moted by the Washington lobbying firm of Robert Gray, who
was cochairman of President Reagan's first inaugural and
communications head for the 1980 Reagan-Bush campaign.
When Congress debated assistance for the 'contras' in
1984, Nicaragua spent $164,869 for daily political analy-
ses by a New York lobbying firm. Several French companies
that wanted to join General Electric in an Air Force
tanker planes deal worth many millions of dollars paid
$483,835 to DGA, a firm headed by a former Transportation
official. 69
67. See Jeffrey L. Sheler [et al.], "Lobbyists Go for
It", U.S. News and World Report . June 17, 1985, pp. 30-34;
here: p. 31.
68. U.S. News and World Report . "Lobbyists Go for
It", p. 31.
69. See U.S. News and World Report , "How Foreign Pow-
ers Play", p. 36f
.
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CHAPTER III
IN THE CENTER OP CRITICISM
A. PAC-Contribut i nns
Similar to the immense overall expansion of the in-
terest group business, the number of Political Action Com-
mittees (PACs) has increased considerably in recent years.
PAC spending, however, has even skyrocketed. In 1977/78,
PACs contributed $34 million to congressional candi-
dates.^® Fourteen years later, during the 1991-92 elec-
tion cycle, the amount was more than six times as high —
$205 million. 71 The number of Representatives who receive
50 per cent or more of total campaign funds from PACs grew
from 63 in 1978 to 194 in 1986. 72
U.S. companies owned in part or whole by foreign
corporations also support PACs. A 1986 survey by the Na-
tional Journal found 92 PACs sponsored by enterprises
where foreign investors held 10% or more of the stock. 73
On a Federal Election Committee / Congressional Research
Service list of those American companies that were at
70. See Berry, The Interest Group Society
, p. 120.
71. See Charles R. Babcock, "Political Donations by
NRA, UPS and Dentists Rise Sharply", The Washington Post
.
May 4, 1993, p. A19
.
72. See "Almost Half of U.S. Representatives Received
50% or More of Campaign Funds from PACs (...)", Common
Cause News . April 7, 1987, p. 1.
73. See Glen, "The Foreign Connection", p. 1832.
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least partly owned by investors from Japan, Canada or the
United Kingdom and that made contributions for congres-
sional elections, Great Britain ranked first with 27 busi-
nesses. Canada was second with 15 corporations and Japan
third with 11. 74
The United Kingdom also leads in the size of PAC
donations. 75 More than 20% of all contributions by corpo-
rations with non-domestic ownership, totalling $571,612,
was spent by the British. Switzerland ranked second, fol-
lowed by Japan (14%) and Canada (12%).
Generally, it has to be noted that PAC donations by
foreign-controlled U.S. corporations totalled only 5 % of
all such contributions. The Japanese, who are most often
criticized for their lobbying activities, provided less
than .5% of all corporate giving. 76 Of those afore-
mentioned 92 foreign-sponsored PACs, only 18 spent $25,000
or more and 35 did not hand out more than $1,000 during
the first 18 months of the 1985-86 election cycle. 77
74. See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Re-
search Service, CRS Report for Congress, Lobbying by For-
eign Interests: Japan , by Richard C. Sachs, April 5, 1991,
p. 6. Data is based on the 1987-88 Election Cycle.
75. See CRS, Lobbying bv Foreign Interests: Japan
, p.
4. Also 1987-88 Election Cycle.
76. See CRS, Lobbying bv Foreign Interests: Japan , p.
20 .
77. See Glen, "Foreign Connection", p. 1837.
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govern-Theoretically, foreign citizens, parties,
ments, and companies are prohibited by federal election
law from direct or indirect participation in money-raising
for all kinds of election campaigns under the requirements
of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. 7
8
However, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) decided in
several actions that these provisions do not apply if only
U.S. citizens are involved in the activities of the PAC
and if the subsidiary is doing business mainly in the
U.S. 79 In a June 1991 ruling, the FEC dismissed a pro-
posal to prohibit PACs by foreign-owned U.S. corporate
subsidiaries. In so doing, it also turned down a recom-
mendation by its own general counsel to ban U.S. companies
with more than 50% foreign ownership from establishing
PACs. 80 Even completely foreign-controlled U.S. companies
are thus allowed to operate a PAC. Though the amounts
paid are not large, the mere fact of foreign influence has
created uneasiness among the public.
78. See FECA at Title 2 United States Code, Sections
441 et seq. ; here: Sec. 441e.
79. See Glen, "Foreign Connection", p. 1832.
80. See Wall Street Journal , "Foreign Firms' U.S.
Units Allowed to Operate PACs", June 18, 1991, p. A20(E).
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B. The Revolving Door
In 1988, Michael K. Deaver, White House deputy chief
of staff from 1981 to 1985 and a close personal friend of
the Reagan family, was fined $100,000 for perjury. He had
been convicted of lying under oath when testifying before
the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations about lobbying former colleagues. 8
1
After leaving the government in May 1985, Deaver ran a
public relations firm that represented Saudi Arabia, Mex-
ico, South Korea, and Canada. The case attracted much at-
tention because Deaver seemed to make use of longtime per-
sonal ties with the First Family for his private business.
The fact that he lobbied for Canada on acid rain issues
after being involved in the acid rain policy of the Reagan
administration led several critics to assume that, while
in government office, Deaver had shaded his opinion on the
issue in order to woo a future client.
Deaver is but one example of a considerable number of
U.S. officials who have gone through the 'revolving door';
that is, after leaving their government posts, they joined
law, lobbying, and consulting firms to work on behalf of
domestic or foreign clients. In some instances, those
81. See "Sentenced, Michael Deaver", Time , October 3,
1988, p. 83.
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officials even returned again to other positions in the
government
.
A 1986 General Accounting Office (GAO) study, con-
ducted for a period from 1980 through 1985, showed 76 for-
mer top-level Federal officials represented foreign inter-
ests for 52 countries after leaving office. Another in-
guiry, made in 1990, found that since 1974 47% of former
senior officials of the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative have registered under FARA. 82
The problem of the revolving door has raised the eye-
brows of both Congress and the public. It is feared that
foreign interests gain unseemly influence on public policy
by hiring former U.S. officials. In Agents of influence
,
Pat Choate, ex-vice-president of policy analysis for TRW
Inc., a $7 billion industrial and military manufacturer,
says
,
These ex-officials are highly effective in
representing foreign clients because they pos-
sess a special, intimate knowledge of the inside
workings of America's trade, investment, and re-
lated economic strategies. They also have priv-
ileged access to friends, former colleagues, and
former subordinates who continue to hold high
government office. (83)
82. See U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, CRS Issue Brief, Foreign Interest Lobbying , by
Richard C. Sachs, December 29, 1992, p. 7; and Bruce
Stokes, "USTR's Revolving Door", National Journal , no. 49,
December 8, 1990, p. 2981.
83. Pat Choate, Agents of Influence . (New York, NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
,
p. 50.
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list of well-known names who have been on the pay-
roll of foreign clients includes Paul Warnke, former di-
rector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
chief SALT-negotiator ; Richard Allen, President Reagan's
first national security advisor; and William Colby, former
director of the Central Intelligence Agency . 84
However, under current laws, there are various post-
employment restrictions. Generally, the Ethics Reform Act
of 1989 prohibits all executive branch personnel from
"switching sides"; that is, they are not allowed to ever
represent a private party before a federal agency or
department on a specific issue in which they had been
"personally and substantially" 85 involved while employed
with the government. Similarly, ex-executive branch offi-
cers and employees are banned from "switching sides" for
two years on matters in which they were neither substan-
tially nor personally involved, but which were under their
official responsibility. 86
Besides the "switching sides" restrictions, there are
so-called "'cooling-off'" or "'no contact'" 87 periods.
84. See U.S. News and World Report , "How Foreign Pow-
ers Play", p. 40; and Levy, "Advice", p. 70.
85. See the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 at Title 18
United States Code, Section 207(a)(1)(B).
86. See 18 U.S.C. 207(a)(2).
87. United States Congress, Congressional Research
Service, CRS Report for Congress, Legal and Congressiona l
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Former members of Congress may not, for one year after
leaving office make "with the intent to influence, any
communication to or appearance"® 8 before any member and
any personnel of the legislature. A former staff of a
member is prohibited from lobbying that member or his
staff for one year, too. 89
Section 207(b) of the Ethics Reform Act deals with
former trade officials or employees who had taken part in
trade or treaty negotiations and who had access to non-
public information. Those officials are also barred for
one year from representing other parties with respect to
such negotiations.
Despite congressional efforts to constrain the
revolving door and post-employment lobbying, administra-
tion and enforcement of those clauses are problematic. In
1990, the General Accounting Office investigated the post-
employment provisions of the so-called "Boxer-Bennett Re-
volving Door Act". 90 It was concluded that "DOD and de-
Ethics Standards of Relevance to Those Who Lobby Congress ,
by Jack Maskell, October 18, 1991, p. 5.
88. See 18 U.S.C. 207(e)(1).
89. See 18 U.S.C. 207(e)(2).
90. See Title 10 United States Code, Sections 2397b
and 2397c. Section 2397b bars for two years after leaving
office employment of certain former Department of Defense
(DOD) personnel by defense contractors.
Section 2397c, in subsections (b) (1) (A) (i) and
(b) (1) (A) (ii)
,
requires that defense contractors report
the names of ex-DOD officials and, for a period of two
years after the termination of his or her service, whether
compensation was paid to such officials.
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fense contractors have set up procedures to comply with
the provisions contained in sections 2397b and c." 91 How-
though the act was specifically aimed at Department
of Defense officials, the report continues:
We found that the legislation limited few DOD
personnel from obtaining post-DOD employment
with defense contractors. In addition, some em-
ployees potentially covered by section 2397b may
have been granted permission to accept contrac-
tor employment through a misinterpretation of
the post-DOD employment restriction. (92)
Moreover, it was observed that the reports of the
contractors did not include all the names of the former
DOD employees, as required by the act. 93
The underlying problem with post-employment restric-
tions is that these provisions are to slow down the
revolving door without making employment by the federal
government unattractive. If the post-employment laws were
too strict, it would become difficult for the federal gov-
ernment to find highly-qualified individuals for important
positions. Facing the risk of being restricted as to fu-
ture jobs after ending their service, these persons might
decide not to work at all for the government.
91. United States General Accounting Office, National
Security and International Affairs Division, DOD Revolving
Door: Few Are Restricted From Post-DOD Employment and Re-
porting Has Some Gaps . February 1990, p. 2.
92. GAO, DOD Revolving Door , p. 2.
93. See GAO, DOD Revolving Door , p. 2.
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c. Japan
For several reasons, critics of foreign interest
activities have focused on the Japanese in recent years.
First, the political culture in Japan is different from
the U.S. The word "lobbying" does not exist in
Japanese. ^ Contributions by businesses and private indi-
viduals to politicians and political organizations — over
$2 billion in 1988/89 — are taken for granted. 95 Gifts
from candidates to constituents are also seen as a natural
part of the policy process and range from minor amounts
for social events to the payment of private school fees.
In the early 198 0s, it was estimated that each vote was
worth a refrigerator. 96
Second, Japan has the largest lobbying force in Wash-
ington, D.C. This view is confirmed by the Justice
Department's files of agents registered under FARA. In
1988, 113 American lobbying, public relations and law
94. See CRS
,
Lobbying bv Foreign Interests: Japan , p.
10 .
95. See Steven R. Weisman, "Despite Year of Scandal,
'Money Politics' Seems as Strong as Ever in Japan", The
New York Times . January 29, 1990, p. A6. The article also
cites a professor of political science at Tokyo University
saying that "the consensus among outside political experts
appears to be that this figure represents only 50 or 60
percent of the total money flowing into the political sys-
tem, most of it from businesses."
96. See "Japan's $3 Billion Election", The Economist,
February 3, 1990, pp. 31-32; here: p. 31.
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firms were hired by 152 Japanese companies and government
agencies. The second most active country, Canada, was
represented by 61 — less than half as many — and Great
Britain by 44 such organizations. 98
Third, Japan has most often made use of the revolving
door. A list of some 200 U.S. officials who worked on be-
half of foreign nations after leaving office shows that 70
went to work for the Japanese. 99
With the publication of Agents of Influence . Pat
Choate gained considerable public attention. The volume
is one of the harshest and most controversial critiques of
how the Japanese government and Japanese corporations try
to influence U.S. policy making. 100 Choate asserts that:
1) Japan annually spends $100 million to hire hun-
dreds of lobbyists; and
97. See Pat Choate, "Money Talks: How Foreign Firms
Buy U.S. Clout", The Washington Post . June 19, 1988, pp.
Cl and C4; here: p. Cl; and Choate, Agents of Influence ,
p. xvii.
98. See The Washington Post . "Money Talks", p. C4
.
99. See Choate, Agents of Influence , pp. 208-249.
100. Other works are, for example, James Fallows,
More Like Us: Making America Great Again, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1989); Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of
Japanese Power: People and Politics in—a
—
Stateles_s—Na^
tions, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989); and William J.
Holstein, The Japanese Power Game: What It Means
—
for Amer
ica, (New York [etc.]: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990).
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2) Japan expends another $300 million each year to
"shape American public opinion through its nationwide lo-
cal political network." 101
To illustrate the effectiveness of the Japanese
investment in lobbying, Choate cites some Japanese
"victories" 102
,
one of which was achieved in the automo-
bile sector:
The Japanese have put Voluntary Export Restraints on
the number of cars that they export to the U.S., where
these cars are subject to a tariff of 2.5%. On the other
hand, no limitations are on the import of trucks but there
is a tariff of 25%. Due to the increased output of the
U.S. manufacturers of Toyota, Nissan and Honda, the
Japanese gained some room in their import quotas in the
1980s. To fill up this gap, they reclassified their light
trucks as cars. 103
101. Choate, Agents of Influence
, p. xi.
102. Choate, Agents of Influence
, p. 3.
103. Choate description of the case lacks some de-
tails: U.S. Customs Service based its classification of
imported cars and trucks on the configuration of seats.
Multi-purpose vehicles (also called light trucks or sport-
utility vehicles) with both front and back seats were
treated as cars (2.5% tariff), whereas similar vehicles
with only front seats were considered to be trucks (25%)
.
When importers wanted to fill up their car import quotas,
they put back seats in the light trucks and if the car im-
port quotas were full, they would remove the back seats in
order to import trucks. See Geoff Sundstrom, "Vans, util-
ities socked with a 25% tariff", Automotive News . January
9, 1989, pp. 1 and 6; and the prepared statement of Peter
Levine testifying before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
38
On January 4, 1989, Customs Service rejected this
practice and announced that all multi-purpose vehicles
would be classified as trucks, subject to the higher tar-
iff. William von Raab, then U.S. Commissioner of Customs,
said later:
These vehicles are built on truck bodies. They
have truck characteristics. Most are built in
truck divisions. Most are built in truck facto-
ries. They are advertised as trucks, off-road
vehicles, vans or vehicles that can carry cargo.
For years, the Japanese have certified them as
trucks when importing them into the United
States. Even my grand mother can go into a
parking lot and tell the difference between a
passenger car and a truck. These are
trucks. ( 104)
The Japanese reacted with an intensive lobbying cam-
paign. Japanese government representatives and Japan's
American lobbyists met with officials of the U.S. Trade
Representative, the Department of the Treasury and the
White House. Further, the Japanese provided funds for a
nation-wide public relations campaign.
Within weeks, the Treasury Department overrode the
decision of the Customs and allowed the reclassification
of trucks as cars. 105 The reason was, as Choate says,
that the Treasury Department did not want to annoy
Government Management
,
The Federal Lobbying Disclosure
Laws
. pp. 156-164; here: p. 158.
104. Choate, Agents of Influence , p. 5.
105. The Treasury Department ruled a truck tariff of
25% applied to multi-purpose vehicles with two doors but
not to similar four door versions equipped for passenger
use. See Diana T. Kurylko, "U.S. tones down MPV tariff
hike". Automotive News . February 20, 1989, pp. 1 and 49.
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Japanese investors who had routinely been buying 30-40% of
U.S. Treasury securities. However, for selling these
"cars" to customers, they were again reclassified as
trucks because the fuel-efficiency standards of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency are lower for trucks than for
ca^s • Choate concludes that the decision of the U.S. bu-
reaucracy saved the Japanese $500 million in duties each
year . 106
Choate ' s argument for overwhelming Japanese influence
at the expense of the American interest is not fully con-
vincing, though. After all, it is the American customers
who save $500 million when buying Japanese trucks. In a
review of Agents of Influence
. James Fallows questions
whether "the interests of American producers (in this
case, companies that make light trucks) should outweigh
the interests of the American consumer
.
Moreover, comparison to other literature on the case
reveals that Choate deliberately neglects the role of
European importers (who also had a great interest in lower
tariffs) while over-emphasizing the importance of the
Japanese.
Another Japanese "victory" shows further problems
with evaluating foreign influence. In the 1970s and early
106. See Choate, Agents of Influence , pp. xvi and 6.
107. James Fallows, "The Great Japanese Misunder-
standing", New York Review of Books . Nov. 8, 1990, pp. 33-
39; here: p. 36
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1980s, the U.S. had a strategic advantage over the
U.S.S.R. because the Americans were able to detect Soviet
submarines by using acoustic devices on the floor of the
oceans. in 1987, it was revealed that the Japanese
Toshiba Machine Company, 50.08% of which is owned by
Toshiba Corporation, had sold machine tools to the Soviet
Union to produce quieter propellers for their sub-
marines. This security breach outraged Congress. The
Senate voted by an overwhelming majority for a trade bill
to ban Toshiba imports for two to five years. 109
As a result, Toshiba Corp. set off "one of the
costliest and most aggressive lobbying campaigns ever
mounted by a foreign company". 110 Toshiba America, Inc.,
a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of the Japanese parent com-
pany, also hired lawyers and lobbyists. Since Toshiba
America had its principal place of business in the U.S.,
the company's agents were not required to register under
FARA. 111
108. See David E. Sanger, "Toshiba Details Trail of
Crime In Sale of Machinery to Soviet", The New York Times .
September 10, 1987, pp. A1 and D9
.
109. See Susan F. Rasky, "Top U.S. Corporations Lob-
bying Against Curb on Toshiba Imports", The New York
Times, September 14, 1987, pp. A1 and D12 ; here: D12
.
110. See "Toshiba Corp. Paid Lobbyists Millions to
Soften Sanctions", Los Anaeles Times . October 13, 1988,
part IV, pp. 1 and 16; here: part IV, p. 1.
111. See Los Anaeles Times . "Toshiba Corp. Paid Lob-
byists Millions", part IV, p. 1.
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Congress and to
The lobbyists talked to members of
the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and state. They
held news conferences and had full page advertisements in
major newspapers. They also initiated a letter campaign
by those American employees whose jobs were dependent on
Toshiba imports. 112
In the end, Congress watered down the sanctions and
restricted for three years federal government purchases of
Toshiba equipment, with products unavailable elsewhere be-
ing exempt. Only sales of products of Toshiba Machine
were completely prohibited. 113
The estimated costs of the Toshiba lobbying range
from at least $4.5 million to $20 million — still a good
deal compared to the $10 billion Toshiba would have lost
each year with a comprehensive ban as originally envi-
sioned. 114
Nevertheless, the case for Japanese infiltration of
U.S. politics is not as clear as it may seem. Says Fal-
lows :
112. See Mark B. Baker, "Updating the Foreign Agents
Registration Act to Meet the Current Economic Threat to
National Security", Texas International Law Journal , vol
.
25, Winter 1990, pp. 23-41; here: p. 31.
113. See Los Angeles Times . "Toshiba Corp. Paid Lob-
byists Millions", part IV, p. 16.
114. See Los Angeles Times . "Toshiba Corp. Paid Lob-
byists Millions", part IV, p. 1; and Choate, Agents of In-
fluence
. p. 10.
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Although Choate shows that the lobbyists stimu-late a tremendous amount of activity, he gener-
ally cannot provide conclusive proof that the
foreign money produced results that would not
have happened anyway. (115)
Choate mentions that, in addition to those $20 mil-
lion paid by the Japanese, another $30 million were spent
by U.S. companies that would have suffered from a ban on
Toshiba parts and equipment. 116 Thus, one can argue that
even if there had been no lobbying efforts by the
Japanese, Congress would have moved away from its initial
proposal since many U.S. jobs would have been put in jeop-
ardy.
Despite Choate's book, the issue of the effectiveness
of Japanese lobbying still appears to be an open question.
As Hiroshi Fujita, a former bureau chief of a news agency
in Washington, D.C. put it, " 'If the Japan lobby is truly
as effective as Choate claims, why has the U.S. Congress
managed to adopt Super 301 and the Omnibus Trade Bill,
which are detrimental to Japan's national interest?'" 117
115. Fallows, "The Great Japanese Misunderstanding",
p. 34 f
.
116. See Choate, Agents of Influence , p. 10.
117. "Guilty As Charged?", Business Tokyo , vol. 4
(Nov. 1990), pp. 18-24; here: p. 24. The Omnibus Trade
Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) for the first time defined U.S.
trade policy in a comprehensive way. Besides traditional
matters such as quotas and tariffs, it also included is-
sues like patent law, Third World debt, and currency im-
balances. The Super 301 provision, which is a part of the
act, requires procedures for naming countries with large
trade surpluses and unfair trade practices, for negotiat-
ing for improvements, and for U.S. retaliation if negotia-
tions fail. See Elizabeth Wehr, "Senate Clears Trade Bill
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Factors that contribute to the confusion about for-
eign lobbying are, as has been mentioned above, the in-
ability of the existing laws to fully disclose the extent
of the activities. The amounts published under FARA seem
to be high, but they are often misleading. For example, a
Bri"tish firm paid some $9.5 million to the law firm of
/ Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison for representa-
tion by Terence Fortune, a former State Department legal
adviser. 118 Mr. Fortune, however, says that less than 2%,
only an amount of $156,000, was spent on lobbying while
the rest were normal legal fees. 119
Second, the messages lobbyists convey to those who
are lobbied are often communicated in a private atmo-
sphere. Since the public is excluded from witnessing
these talks or procedures, suspicion arises easily.
by Lopsided Vote", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report .
August 6, 1988, pp. 2215-2216; and Elizabeth Wehr, "U.S.
Plies Uncharted Waters In Effort to Open Markets", Con-
gressional Quarterly Weekly Report
. May 20, 1989, pp.
1170-1175.
In May 1989, President Bush identified Japan as en-
gaging in unfair trade. See Elizabeth Wehr, "Japan, In-
dia, Brazil Cited For Import Barriers", Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report
.
May 27, 1989, pp. 1242-1243.
However, Japan was removed from the list after suc-
cessful negotiations in April 1990. See Clayton Jones,
"US-Japan Trade Strain Lessened - For Now", The Christian
Science Monitor . April 30, 1990, p. 6.
118. See Choate, Agents of Influence , p. 223.
119. See Fallows, "The Great Japanese Misunderstand-
ing", p. 33. Fallows wryly adds that " [l]awyers' fees
like these may be considered scandalous, but they are part
of an older and more familiar scandal than the one Choate
is describing."
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Third, the policy decision making process is very
complex. States the Congressional Research Service:
In major policy debates, many forces come into
play; the role of the lobbyists is but one of
these. Members of Congress and other policymak-
ers make decisions based on many complex ele-
ments. Party, ideological and philosophical be-
liefs; countervailing interest group pressures;
career considerations; constituent pressures;
and the belief that a decision will lead to good
public policy are some of these. (120)
For the given reasons, it has been difficult to de-
termine precisely a relationship between the lobbyists'
methods and activities and their results. To enhance
clarity, several members of Congress have taken up the is-
sue in recent years. A series of hearings was initiated.
120 .
p . 9
.
See CRS
,
T.obbvina bv Foreign Interestsj
—
Japan
,
CHAPTER IV
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. Investigations of fara
In 1991, the Committee on Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management held
hearings on the implementation of FARA by the Department
of Justice. It was found that the act suffers from sev-
eral deficiencies.
Two major loopholes in the law are due to the lack of
clarity in statutory language. Subcommittee staff re-
viewed the aforementioned case of the U.S. Customs Service
ruling to raise tariffs on imported light trucks. Forty-
eight lobbyists were identified as representing those who
• •
*1 O 1
opposed the Customs decision. Of these 48 representa-
tives, 45 worked on behalf of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
manufacturers. 122 Only four of the 45 lobbyists were reg-
istered under FARA (ironically, they told the staff they
were presumably not compelled to do so) . The other 41
were not registered at all.
Asked why they did not file with the Department of
Justice, the interest group representatives showed great
121. See Levine, The Federal Lobbying Disclosure
Laws, p. 159f
.
122. The other three were one consultant to a foreign
manufacturer and two representatives of the Japan Automo-
bile Manufacturers Association.
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differences in interpreting FARA's exemption. Some lobby-
ists said they were covered by the attorney's exemption.
Others maintained the domestic subsidiary provision ap-
plied to them. Not having issued any definitive, written
interpretation of the statute, the Justice Department of-
fered little help in clarifying the issue and, thus, con-
tributed to confusion.
The administration of FARA has also been examined by
the U.S. General Accounting Office, which published three
reports in 1974, 1980, and 1990. The 1990 study says:
We . . . found that the Justice Department's dis-
closure criteria is unclear. Both foreign
agents and the Justice Department officials who
review the agents' registration forms lack spe-
cific written guidance on what should be re-
ported. (12 3)
Further, the GAO questioned administrative procedures
that did not serve the underlying purpose of the act:
"The questions on the semiannual statements are general
and do not specifically require the information necessary
to satisfy the act's disclosure requirements." 124
Conversely, the Justice Department more recently
circulated disclosure guidelines that seem to be extrane-
ous to the purpose of FARA. For instance, registrants
123. United States General Accounting Office,
"Foreign Agent Registration: Justice Needs to Improve Pro-
gram Administration", The Federal Lobbying Disclosure
Laws
. pp. 464-475; here: p. 466.
124. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Foreign Agent
Registration", The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws , p.
466.
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were required to disclose "all activities undertaken on
behalf of, and all services rendered to, each foreign
principal". This included participation in seminars,
conferences, conventions, and the like — activities that
do not have to be revealed under the act.
Enforcement issues were another matter of concern of
the investigators. The 1990 GAO report states:
The Justice Department currently maintains files
on approximately 775 foreign agents. Our review
of Justice's files on a random sample of 46 of
these agents indicated that one-half of them had
not fully disclosed their activities; over one-
half registered initial forms late; and over
one-half filed their required semiannual reports
late. (126)
The number of inspections performed by the Registra-
tion Unit to review the files of registrants and make sure
that their activities are accurately disclosed has dropped
in recent years. Four inspections were conducted in 1990,
down from 14 in 1989. By contrast, the Registration Unit
had conducted 166 inspections in a one-and-a-half year pe-
riod during the mid-1970s. 127
FARA is mainly enforced through telephone calls and
letters to registrants and potential registrants. Accord-
125. Guidelines for Responses on Supplemental State-
ments, The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws , p. 549.
(Emphasis in the original.)
126. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Foreign Agent
Registration", The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws , p.
466.
127. See Levine, The Federal Lobbying Disclosure
Laws, p. 162.
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^-^9 the chief of the Registration Unit, about seven or
eight formal notices of deficiency or failure to register
were sent out between 1988 and 1991. That compares to 62
notices during a similar three year period in the early
1970s. 128
To enforce the statute, FARA provides the Department
of Justice with both criminal and civil injunctive author-
ity. Administrative fines or civil monetary penalties are
not authorized under the act, though. Therefore, few
court actions have ever been initiated — ten or so cases
in the 1970s and only one since. 129
To sum up, FARA seems to be "plagued with loopholes,
unclear and sometimes excessive disclosure requirements,
•
.non
and inadequate enforcement mechanisms. "-LJW Under these
circumstances, it is no wonder that foreign lobbyists have
drawn their own conclusions about the meaning of the act.
B. 102d Congress
Four forces appear to be driving Congress to modify
lobbying legislation. These are: 1) the longstanding
178. See Levine, The Federal Lobbvina Disclosure
Laws, p. 162.
179. See Levine, The Federal Lobbvina Disclosure
Laws, p. 162.
nn. Levine, The Federal Lobbvina Disclosure Laws, p.
13.
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failure of current disclosure requirements; 2) scandals
caused by lobbyists such as Michael K. Deaver; 3) the
widely held view that pressure groups exert too much in-
fluence on Capitol Hill; and, 4) the opinion of numerous
members of Congress that, though not illegal or prohib-
ited, certain interest group activities may be harmful to
sound governance. 13
1
Congressional efforts to tighten control over foreign
lobbying have developed around a three-fold approach: one,
modify FARA; two, prohibit campaign contributions by for-
eign-controlled U.S. corporations; and three, restrict
post-employment lobbying.
In the 102d Congress, five major bills dealing with
interest group laws were introduced. The most significant
provisions of these bills are explained in the following.
H.R. 806, the "Ethics in Foreign Lobbying Act of
1991", sponsored by Representative Frank Guarini, D-N.J.,
would have amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 and prohibited PAC-contributions by corporations with
more than 50% foreign ownership. 132 The "attorney exemp-
131. See U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, CRS Report for Congress, Regulating Interest Groups,!
Lobby Law Reform In The 102d Congress , by Richard C.
Sachs, May 18, 1992, p. 2.
132. See U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 806 , February 5,
1991, 102d Congress, 1st Session, at Section 2.
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tion" was to be closed by requiring potential registrants
to file an affirmative request for exemption. 133
Another provision of the bill set up one central
institution for collecting publicly available information
that had so far been published by the several agencies.
This "clearinghouse", affiliated to the Federal Election
Commission, would be responsible for data required to be
made public by the Department of Justice (in the case of
FARA)
,
the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Sen-
ate (in the case of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act), and the Federal Election Commission (in the case of
the Federal Election Campaign Act). 134 It would also
gather information printed in the Congressional Record as
well as disclosures within the context of House and Senate
rules as to honoraria. The reason for centrally collect-
ing and analyzing data on both foreign and domestic lobby-
ing is the belief that, though much information is avail-
able, it is not as beneficial to the public as it could be
because it is dispersed in many locations.
H.R. 809 was introduced by Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio.
The bill, which is entitled "Foreign Agents Compulsory
Ethics in Trade Act of 1991", barred the president, the
133. See H.R. 806 . at Sec. 6(b).
134. See H.R. 806 . at Sec. 4.
135. See CRS, Lobbying bv Foreign Interest: Japan, p.
19.
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vice-president and any member of Congress as well as cer-
tain military and civilian officials for four years after
termination of their service from lobbying on behalf of
foreign entities. 136 Upon application, however, the At-
torney General would be permitted to waive this provi-
sion. 137
Rep. Dan Glickman was the sponsor of H.R. 1725, the
"Foreign Interest Representation Act of 1991". This bill
sought to amend FARA and substituted terms like "agent of
^ foreign principal" and "propaganda" with less pejorative
sounding ones such as "representative of a foreign princi-
pal" and "promotional or informational materials." 138
Further, H.R. 1725 presented civil penalties for noncom-
pliance with the act besides the existing criminal punish-
ment. 139
136. See U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 809 . February 5,
1991, 102d Congress, 1st Session, at Section 2 (a) (a). An-
other bill by Rep. Dan Glickman, D-Kan.
,
H.R. 3966, even
suggested a permanent prohibition (instead of restrictions
for a period of time) from representing foreign principals
before the U.S. government for employees of the legisla-
tive and executive branch and members of Congress who had
taken part in trade negotiations or who had access to data
regarding such negotiations. See U.S. Congress, House,
H.R. 3966 . November 26, 1991, 102d Congress, 1st Session,
at Sections 1 (2) (B) (ii) (I) and 1 (2) (B) (ii) (II)
.
137. See H.R. 809 . at Sec. 2(a) (e)(1).
138. See U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 1725 . April 11,
1991, 102d Congress, 1st Session, at Sections 2(a)(1) and
2(b) (2) .
139. See H.R. 1725 . at Sec. 1(f).
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H.R. 3597, introduced by Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass.,
contained many of the proposals put forward in the
aforementioned bills such as renaming FARA and replacing
dated terms. Filings of the initial and the supplemental
reports were curtailed and clarified. Registrants were
required to submit information including a description of
the financial terms of the employment and disclosure of
activities known or planned like testimony before Congress
or communications with members of Congress and their
staff. 140 The bill changed FARA' s provision of semiannual
supplements into quarterly reports, 141 which generally
pursue the information requested with the initial regis-
tration.
Moreover, the lawyer's exemption in Sec. 613(g) of
FARA was modified to only apply to attorneys if they ap-
pear before a court, not in normal agency proceedings. 142
Enforcement provisions were altered to encompass criminal
as well as civil penalties, the latter ranging from $2,000
to $1, 000, 000. 143
In the Senate, efforts to update FARA focused on S.
2279, sponsored by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich. , and William
S. Cohen, R-Maine. The bill was reintroduced on May 21,
140. See H.R. 3597 . at Sec. 2.
141. See H.R. 3597. at Sec. 2(c).
142. See H.R. 3597 . at Sec. 3 (b)
.
143. See H.R. 3597. at Sec. 4.
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1992 as S. 2766. Like the House proposals, it was not en-
acted and thus died at the end of the 102d Congress. But
the bill was brought back to life in the 103d Congress.
C. 103d Congress
On February 4, 1993, Sen. Levin introduced S. 349,
the "Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993", to the 103d
Congress. The Senate passed the measure by a 95-to-2 vote
on May 6, 1993. 144
S. 349 would fundamentally change existing lobbying
laws. First, it would close the loopholes in the disclo-
sure statutes to ensure that all professional lobbyists
are registered. Regardless of whether they lobby members
of Congress, their staffs, or officials of the executive
or the legislative branch, all interest group representa-
tives who are paid more than $5,000 by all or $1,000 by a
particular client in a semiannual period have to regis-
ter. 145 This provision also includes lawyers and would
thus put an end to the attorney's exemption.
Second, the bill would substitute existing lobbying
disclosure laws with a single statute. S. 349 would re-
place the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, FARA's regu-
144. See The New York Times . "Senate Passes Stringent
New Rules for Lobbyists", p. A18.
145. See U.S. Congress, S. 349 . May 11, 1993, 103d
Congress, 1st Session, at Sec. 4(a)(2)(A).
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lations applying to private persons and companies, the
disclosure requirements of the so-called Byrd Amend-
ment, 146 and the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment disclosure statutes. 147 FARA's requirements regard-
ing foreign governments and parties would be preserved,
as would be the provisions of the Byrd Amendment prohibit-
ing lobbying for loans, grants, or contracts with appro-
priated federal funds. 148
Third, disclosure requirements would be streamlined
by consolidating filing in a single form and a single lo-
cation ("one-stop shopping") . Instead of separate regis-
trations for each employee-lobbyists, the new law envi-
sions a single registration by every organization whose
employees lobby. FARA's and the Byrd Amendment's provi-
sion to name each officials contacted would be replaced by
a list of all committees and agencies that were dealt
with. Further information required by the registrant in-
cludes the identity of his clients, the issue area lob-
bied, the names of employees who had worked in government
positions during the previous two years, 149 and amounts of
146. Named after Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W.Va. See Title
31 United States Code, Section 1352.
147. See Title 42 U. S.C. 3537b.
148. See S. 349, at Sections 12 and 13
149. See S. 349. at Sec. 4.
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financial benefits. 150 Supplemental reports would have to
be filed semiannually
.
151
Fourth, a new and more effective system to administer
and enforce the regulations would be created. s. 349
establishes an Office of Lobbying Registration and Public
Disclosure within the Department of Justice, headed by a
Director appointed by the president with the consent of
the Senate. 152 The office would provide the public with
guidance on how to comply with the act, enhance public ac-
cess to filed materials through new computer systems, and
impose administrative fines of up to $200,000 for noncom-
pliance.
Sen. Levin and his colleagues have worked several
years to build support for their bill. Past efforts to
reform lobbying laws often fell victim to quarrels among
the parties or to passivity in Congress. Moreover, some
were afraid that a new law would impinge on the First
•
. 153
Amendment guarantees to speech, assembly, and petition.
"'Every time Congress has considered reforming the worn-
150. See S
.
349, at Sec. 5(C) .
151. See S 349, at Sec. 5(a) .
152. See S
.
349, at Sec. 6.
153 . Thus, S. 349 prescribes in Sec. 11(a) that
" [n]othing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit, or
to authorize the Director or any court to prohibit, lobby-
ing activities or lobbying contacts by any person, regard-
less of whether such person is in compliance with the re-
quirements of this Act."
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out lobbying registration laws'", said Levin, "'we found
ourselves pinioned between those who would say we have
called for too much disclosure and those who would call
for greater disclosure.'" 154
Nevertheless, S. 349 charts a middle course. It bal-
ances the need to publicly reveal lobbying activities by
professional interest group representatives with the
necessity to exclude those who, for example, undertake
routine negotiations of contracts, testify before congres-
sional committees, or request the status of an action.
Major emphasis in the bill is put on the recognition
of lobbying as a legitimate activity. As Sen. Levin ex-
pressed it:
Lobbying — that is, seeking to influence
legislation and government policy — is not bad.
Far from it. It is a vital part of our partici-
patory democracy. We deal every day with lobby-
ists for cities, counties, and states; lobbyists
for public hospitals and private relief groups;
lobbyists for police organizations and lobbyists
for the Girl Scouts. Some lobbyists try to pro-
tect the jobs and benefits of our workers; oth-
ers seek to improve the competitiveness of our
industry. Some lobbyist work to keep our
streets safe; some want to keep our air and wa-
ter clean; others seek to reduce taxes. (155)
The language of S. 349 aims at removing the negative
connotation of lobbying by underscoring the importance of
154. See "Senate Passes Bill To Tighten Special In-
terest Disclosure", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report ,
May 8, 1993, pp. 1123-1124; here: p. 1123.
155. Carl Levin, Statement of Senator Carl Levin on
Introduction of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993 ,
February 4, 1993, p. 1.
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interest group representatives in the policy process. Af-
ter all, lobbyists are a major source of information and
research for members of Congress.
That the perception of special interest advocates is
different from the old laws, can also be seen in the en-
forcement regulations of the bill. FARA, for example,
punishes violators with up to five years of imprison-
ment. 156 The message is that convicted lobbyists are dan-
gerous enough to be locked up. 157 The new law, on the
other hand, contains informal ways to deal with noncompli-
ance and provides for civil penalties.
Further, compliance with the act is encouraged. For-
eign lobbyists testifying at congressional hearings com-
plained about the "filing of voluminous reports" and
considered the "burdensome nature of the reporting" to be
the "primary deterrent" to register. 158 S. 349 would sim-
plify reporting of the lobbyists' expenditures by replac-
ing the old system of detailed lists of costs and receipts
by estimates in categories from, for example, $1,000 to
$10,000 or $50,000 to $50, 000. 159
156. See 22 U.S.C., at Sec. 618(a)(2).
157. See CRS
,
Regulating Interest Groups , p. 13.
158. See The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws , pp. 24
and 22.
159. See S. 349 . at Sec. 5(d)(1).
58
Registration for those lobbyists who work on behalf
of both domestic and foreign clients would be less time-
consuming. No longer would they be required to register
separately with the Department of Justice (required by
FARA)
,
with the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the
Senate (required by the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act)
,
with the Secretary of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (required in the case of lobbying HUD)
,
and/ or with the respective agency or department (required
by the Byrd Amendment) . Also, the Office of Lobbying Reg-
istration and Public Disclosure would be allowed to bol-
ster compliance by granting an extension of 30 days for
late-filings if good cause is shown. 160
Legislation similar to S. 349 has been introduced to
the House (H.R. 823) . A markup by the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Administrative Law is expected this session.
The measure, which The New York Times called "the first
serious attempt to overhaul controls of lobbying since
1946"
,
161 is reported to have broad support. Its eventual
passage therefore seems likely.
160. See S. 349 . at Sec. 5(f).
161 . The New York Times . "Senate Passes Stringent New
Rules for Lobbyists", p. A18.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Why do many Americans condemn foreign lobbying? They
learn in newspapers that hundreds of millions of dollars
are spent annually on lawyer-lobbyists in Washington, D.C.
They then wonder whether anybody would disburse such enor-
mous amounts without expecting something precious in re-
turn. They conclude that foreign powers manipulate the
governmental decision making process.
This study, however, has shown how difficult — if
not impossible — it is to actually prove the effects of
foreign lobbying. In virtually all cases where foreign
countries were said to have influenced decision making in
Washington, it turned out that foreign lobbying efforts
were backed or even dominated by domestic interest groups
or domestic lobbyists. Without domestic support, foreign
lobbyists can hardly achieve anything.
In fact, foreign lobbying is rather a matter of in-
formation-gathering than of buying influence. A major
part of the lobbyists' time is simply devoted to finding
out what issues the government is working on. The non-
hierarchical structure of the U.S. bureaucracy with its
numerous independent agencies makes it imperative for for-
eign businesses to monitor many political actors, not just
a few officials in key departments. Due to the growth of
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the international economy
,
embassy personnel cannot per-
form this task adequately anymore, and therefore companies
hire their own representatives.
To illuminate the activities of foreign lobbyists,
Congress enacted FARA. However, the nature of foreign
lobbying — and the entire economic and political world —
has changed significantly since the enactment of the
statute in 1938. Hence, a reform of the laws regulating
special interest representation has become necessary.
Congress has addressed this subject by examining the lob-
bying laws, PAC-contributions, and the revolving door phe-
nomenon .
As it appears now, a major rearrangement of the do-
mestic and foreign lobbying statutes will take place dur-
ing the 103d Congress. Many of the shortcomings contained
in the old laws will be removed by substituting existing
lobbying laws with a single statute, closing the loopholes
of the current laws, streamlining disclosure requirements,
and establishing a more effective system for administra-
tion and enforcement.
Congress has also produced several campaign finance
reform bills in recent years, none of which has found its
way into law. It seems unlikely, though, that a measure
aimed simply at PACs by foreign-owned corporations will be
enacted. This would, indeed, be inappropriate. As has
been shown above, foreign-owned U.S. companies contributed
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to PACs only on a small scale. Further, prohibiting em-
ployees of U.S. subsidiaries from operating PACs would
create two classes of citizens: those who happen to work
for an American company and, hence, are allowed to partic-
ipate in the political process, and those who are banned
from doing so because they happen to be employed by
"foreigners .
"
Congress has not acted with sufficient determination
on the revolving door problem. 162 Admittedly, there are
various post-employment restrictions. However, these pro-
visions are dispersed in several laws and have proved to
be difficult to administer and to enforce. The similarity
to the patchwork of the old lobbying registration laws is
obvious. It would be advisable that Congress, as in the
case of the lobbying statutes, initiate a thorough review
process and, subsequently, come up with a new act.
Whether ex-government officials work on behalf of foreign
or domestic interests, should be unimportant, though. It
would certainly be wrong to only deny foreigners access to
this knowledgeable group in a country where equal opportu-
nity plays such important a role. If Congress considers
the employment of government officials shortly after
termination of their service as harmful to the public good
162. Political scientists have also neglected this
aspect though it has created uneasiness among members of
Congress and the public time and again. Further research
on the effects of the revolving door phenomenon therefore
seems desirable.
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and, thus, as illegitimate, the revolving door should be
closed for all potential beneficiaries, both domestic and
foreign.
Summing up the discussion of foreign lobbying, one
thing becomes clear: in our globalized economy, it is very
hard to distinguish between the domestic and the foreign
sphere. Three million U.S. citizens — some 10% of the
total American manufacturing force — work for foreign-
owned companies . 3 Would anybody accuse them of being
disloyal Americans or of furthering pernicious foreign
influence? Certainly not.
Consequently, like their fellow Americans, these
workers and their companies have the right to participate
in the policy process. They have the same duties as Amer-
ican firms — paying taxes, abiding to environmental laws,
to name but two — so they deserve to have the same op-
portunities as their competitors.
Unlike its more closed counterparts in many coun-
tries, the U.S. political system offers a high degree of
citizen participation. Interest group representation and
the resulting multitude of ideas and information are valu-
able assets of American democracy. More, this pluralism
is actually a prerequisite for sound governance. The
fragmented structure of the U.S. Congress with its decen-
163. See Robert B. Reich, "Who Is Us?", Harvard Busi-
ness Review , vol. 68 (Jan. -Feb. 1990), pp. 53-64; here: p.
55.
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tralizsd power structure end its multiple decision points
requires active involvement and control by the citizens
and their representatives. Subgovernments, the tradi-
tional model of U.S. policy making, thrived "in the ab-
sence of competing interest groups, not in spite of
them." 164
Today's issue networks, by contrast, no longer have a
small number of special interest advocates. While basi-
cally the same groups partake in subgovernments and issue
networks, it is the size of the networks and their
accessibility to new participants that make a difference.
Understandably, foreign corporations have followed the
trend set by American businesses to have their interests
represented in Washington. In today's international econ-
omy, it is natural that international business interests
want their opinion heard in Washington, too. Therefore,
and though it might be difficult to accept for Ross Perot:
foreign lobbyists are legitimate participants in the U.S.
policy process.
164. See Berry, The Interest Group Society, P- 180
(emphasis in the original)
.
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APPENDIX
FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
FOR 1981, 1984, 1987 -1990
1981 1984 1987 1988 1989 1990
Belgium 9 8 13 6 5 6
CnnaHa 46 69 98 102 91 81
Hong Xnng 9 8 16 20 13 12
Japan 86 89 123 127 108 114
Korea 34 39 46 45 34 32
Mexico 40 38 29 21 18 24
Netherlands 18 17 16 16 11 14
Switzerland 13 8 20 24 18 22
United Kingdom 36 45 81 83 65 68
USSR 27 21 19 16 14 19
West Germany 39 46 63 54 51 53
(Source: Department of Justice. See United States Con-
gress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for
Congress, Lobbying bv Foreign Interests: Japan , by Richard
C. Sachs, April 4, 1991, p. 3)
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